The seminal result of Impagliazzo and Rudich (STOC 1989) gave a black-box separation between one-way functions and public-key encryption: a public-key encryption scheme cannot be constructed using one-way functions in a black-box way. In addition, their result implied black-box separations between one-way functions and protocols for certain Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) functionalities (in particular, Oblivious Transfer). Surprisingly, however, since then there has been no further progress in separating oneway functions and SFE functionalities. In this work, we present the complete picture for finite deterministic 2-party SFE functionalities, vis a vis one-way functions. We show that in case of semi-honest adversaries, one-way functions are black-box separated from all such SFE functionalities, except the ones which have unconditionally secure protocols (and hence do not rely on any computational hardness). In the case of active adversaries, a black-box one-way function is indeed useful for SFE, but we show that it is useful only as much as access to an ideal commitment functionality is useful.
INTRODUCTION
How useful is a random oracle in two-party secure function evaluation (SFE)? One obvious use of a random oracle is for implementing commitment. We show that, remarkably, for finite 2-party SFE 1 a random oracle by itself is only as useful as a commitment functionality. This is remarkable since in many other contexts in cryptography (including many protocol settings, like the use of Fiat-Shamir heuristics for NIZK), the random oracle is vastly more useful than standard primitives.
This result has important implications in understanding the "complexity" of secure function evaluation functionalities vis a vis computational primitives like one-way functions. An important goal in cryptography is to understand the qualitative complexity of various cryptographic primitives. In the seminal work of Impagliazzo and Rudich [21] a formal framework was established to qualitatively separate cryptographic primitives like symmetric-key encryption and public-key encryption from each other. Understanding that such a separation exists has been hugely influential in theoretical and practical cryptographic research in the subsequent decades: to optimize on both security and efficiency dimensions, a cryptographic construction would be based on symmetric-key primitives when possible, and otherwise is shown to "require" public-key primitives.
Beyond encryption, the result in [21] already implies the separation of certain SFE functionalities (in particular, Oblivious Transfer) from one-way functions. Surprisingly, however, since then there has been no further progress on separating SFE functionalities and one-way functions, although several other black-box separation results have emerged [48, 12, 13, 7, 24, 43, 18] . In this work, we present the complete picture for finite deterministic 2-party SFE functionalities vis a vis one-way functions: we show that in the case of security against semi-honest adversaries, all of them are black-box separated from one-way functions, except the ones which are trivial (which have unconditionally perfectly secure protocols). In the case of active adversaries, a black-box one-way function is indeed useful for SFE, but we show that it is useful only as much as access to a commitment functionality is useful (and explicitly characterize the functions for evaluating which it is useful).
Our work could be viewed as a confluence of two largely disjoint lines of work -one on black-box one-way functions, and one on the structure of secure function evaluation functionalities. The former line essentially started with [21] . The latter can be traced back to concurrent work [8, 5, 33] which combinatorially characterized which finite functionalities have (perfectly) semi-honest secure protocols. This characterization of 2-party functionalities, in terms of a combinatorial property called decomposability [33] , will be important for us. Several later works obtained such combinatorial characterizations of SFE functionalities in different contexts (e.g., [25, 6, 27, 41, 30, 31, 29] ).
An important ingredient of our proof is the "frontier analysis" approach from [39, 38] . As we shall see, frontier analysis provides a powerful means to work with otherwisesubtle conditional probabilities, especially as arising in 2party protocols. In essence, it is simply a means to explicitly keep track of the order in which various events occur in a protocol (or more generally, in a sequence of random variables). But as we shall see, having an explicit mental picture lets us define frontiers and reason about their properties that are a priori not obvious. The proof in [9] could in fact be viewed as an instance of frontier analysis (and is one of the earliest ones that the authors are aware of). Another example (in a non-cryptographic setting) is the work of Barak et al. [2] who consider frontiers in a protocol where significant amounts of "new and relevant" information is revealed, and use this to reduce the total amount of communication.
Blackbox Separations. Black-box constructions form a general framework of obtaining a (more complex) cryptographic primitive Q (e.g., pseudorandom generators) from another (perhaps simpler) cryptographic primitive P (e.g., one-way functions) while P is used in the implementation of Q only as a black-box and the security of Q is proved based on the security of P also through a black-box argument. Apart from being the most common kind of reductions used in cryptographic constructions (with "provable security"), black-box reductions provide us with a framework to understand "complexity" of cryptographic primitives. This line of research was initiated in the seminal work of Impagliazzo and Rudich [21] who showed that public-key cryptography is strictly more complex than symmetric-key cryptography (say, one-way functions) under this framework.
Our main technical results are proven in the computationally unbounded setting, and the (honest-but-curious) adversaries implicit in our proofs use super-polynomial computational power (even if the honest parties were polynomial time). However, similar to the results in [21] , this can be translated to a statement about black-box separation of semi-honest SFE protocols (for functions without perfectly secure protocols) from one-way functions, in a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) setting. Intuitively, this is so because a random oracle is a strong one-way function (but for the drawback that it does not have a small code to implement it); so, if one-way function is the sole computational primitive needed for a construction, and it is used in a blackbox manner, then it should be possible to base the construction on a random oracle instead. Hence, ruling out secure protocols in the random oracle model in the computationally unbounded setting would rule out protocols in the PPT setting that base their security on one-way functions in a black-box manner.
The Many-Worlds Conjecture. An added significance of our black-box separation is that it is part of proving a larger conjecture regarding computational assumptions associated with cryptographic reductions. In [40] , a cryptographic complexity theory was introduced, where the objects of study were secure reductions between 2-party (or more generally, multi-party) functionalities. The existence of each such reduction in the PPT setting could be considered as a computational assumption. There it was conjectured that there are only a few (in particular, finitely many) "distinct" assumptions, when the notion of secure reduction used is that of universally composable (UC) security. This was based on the fact that a large range of such assumptions were shown to be equivalent to either the existence of one-way functions or oblivious transfer protocols. In terms of "Impagliazzo's Worlds," [19] , this conjecture states that there are only a few worlds between minicrypt and cryptomania that correspond to these reductions. We refer to this conjecture from [40] as the Few Worlds Conjecture.
In this work, we conjecture that there are infinitely many worlds intermediate to minicrypt and cryptomania, that correspond to semi-honest secure reductions between 2-party functionalities. In fact, we conjecture that the same holds, even restricted to making one of the functionalities trivial (i.e., each world corresponds to a finite function f having a semi-honest secure protocol in the plain model). Note that this new conjecture -which we term the Many Worlds Conjecture (or MWC, for short) -does not contradict the Few Worlds Conjecture, since it considers semi-honest security rather than UC security. (The technical difference between the two settings is that for UC secure reductions, the simulator is required to "extract" an adversary's input, and this often implies a secure oblivious transfer protocol.)
The black-box separation result we prove could be considered as a first step towards proving the MWC. It shows that the assumption that an undecomposable function has a semihonest protocol (i.e., it can be semi-honest securely reduced to a trivial functionality) is distinct from the assumption that one-way functions exist. In subsequent work, we further strengthened this separation to show that it is distinct from the assumption that public-key encryption exists [37] . In ongoing work, we investigate an approach to proving the MWC by showing that, corresponding to any two 2-party functionalities such that one cannot be semi-honest-securely reduced to the other information-theoretically, there are two "distinct worlds." 2 This approach relies on the result in this work as a basic building block.
Our Results
Our main result is the following.
Theorem 1.1. A deterministic two-party function f , with a polynomially large domain, has a semi-honest secure protocol against computationally unbounded adversaries in the random oracle model if and only if f has a perfectly semihonest secure protocol in the plain model.
We remark that such f can be explicitly characterized as decomposable functions as defined in [33] (if f is symmetric), or more generally, as those for which the symmetric function f ′ obtained as the "common information" part of f 3 is decomposable and f and f ′ are "isomorphic." 4 We remark that decomposability was originally defined for finite functions that do not depend on the security parameter; in our treatment, where we allow the function to depend on the security parameter, a function is said to be decomposable if for all but finitely many values of the security parameter, it is decomposable in the original sense.
In this theorem, as is conventional in much of the work on the combinatorial structure of SFE functionalities, we restrict ourselves to functions whose domain size is polynomial in the security parameter. A full combinatorial characterization of semi-honest securely realizable functions (even in the plain model) is known only with this restriction. In 2 It is known that the existence of "simple" (e.g., constant round) protocols for a functionality could be used to realize a complete functionality; this was discussed in [12] and recently explicitly proven in [35] . However, this does not contradict the above approach to proving the MWC, since these results apply only for restricted classes of protocols. 3 For a deterministic two-party function f : X × Y → ZA × ZB, the common information function f ′ is defined as follows (see for e.g., [42] . Intuitively, f ′ (x, y) reveals only that part of the information about (x, y) that f reveals to "commonly" to both Alice and Bob (and so they know that it is known to the other party as well). 4 As defined in [42] , f0 and f1 are isomorphic if there is a UC and semi-honest secure protocol for evaluating either function which uses a single instance of the other function with no other communication. In particular, if either function has a semi-honest secure protocol in the random oracle model (resp. plain model), then the other one has such a protocol too. particular, there are undecomposable functions, with super polynomial domain size, which are semi-honest securely realizable. Henceforth, unless mentioned otherwise, whenever we consider a function we shall assume that its domain size is polynomial in the security parameter.
The above result -that random oracles are useless for 2-party SFE -does not hold in the case of security against active adversaries. In particular, note that the commitment functionality Fcom, can be constructed UC-securely in a black-box manner from random oracles, and so, all the functions which can be UC-securely computed in the Fcom hybrid can also be UC-securely computed in the random oracle model. But we shall show that this is all that a random oracle is useful for in 2-party SFE. This follows from Theorem 1.1 and a compiler from [39] that turns semi-honest secure protocols to UC-secure protocols in the Fcom-hybrid model (refer to the full version of this paper [36] for proof).
Theorem 1.2. A deterministic two-party function f , with a polynomially large domain, has a statistically UC-secure (and equivalently, a statistically standalone-secure) protocol in the random oracle model if and only if f has a statistically UC-secure (and equivalently, a statistically standalonesecure) protocol in the Fcom hybrid.
We remark that such f can be characterized as those for which, on removing all "redundant inputs" 5 one at a time, we obtain a function of the kind in Theorem 1.1.
As mentioned earlier, these results for random oracles in the computationally unbounded setting translate to blackbox separation results from one-way functions, in the PPT setting. We follow the definitions in [47] , with slight technical modifications, to state our results. A formal statement appears in the full version of this paper [36] . We summarize this result informally below. Note that, though commitment is already known to be blackbox equivalent to one-way functions, statistical (standalone) security in the Fcom-hybrid is, a priori, more restrictive than standalone security in the PPT setting using fully black-box commitments. Further, the theorem holds for not only oneway functions, but also the other computational primitives mentioned above.
Though we state the result for one-way functions, in fact, any collection of primitives that can be constructed from a random oracle (or ideal cipher) or a random permutation oracle 6 in a black-box manner -one-way functions, oneway permutations, collision resistant hash functions, blockciphers (including exponentially hard versions of these primitives) -is useless for 2-party SFE, if the primitives are used in a fully black-box manner.
Related Work
Impagliazzo and Rudich [21] showed that random oracles are not useful against a computationally unbounded adversary for the task of secure key agreement. This analysis was recently simplified and sharpened in [4, 18] . These results and techniques are one starting point for our result. Indeed, a partial version of our result -when the protocols are restricted to have only κ/ log κ rounds where κ is the length of the inputs to the random oracle (or one-way function)could be derived using techniques in [10, 18] . In subsequent work [37] , by combining the frontier analytic techniques in this work with a more general eavesdropper strategy, we show that public-key encryption (which is significantly more involved than random oracles) is only as useful as the Fcomhyrbid for two-party deterministic secure function evaluation.
Following [21] many other black-box separation results have appeared (e.g., [48, 13, 7, 24, 43] ). In particular, Gertner et al. [12] insightfully asked the question of comparing oblivious-transfer (OT) and key agreement (KA) and showed that OT is strictly more complex (in the sense of [21] ). Another trend of results has been to prove lowerbounds on the efficiency of the implementation reduction in black-box constructions (e.g., [28, 11, 34, 15, 3, 4, 15] ). A complementary approach has been to find black-box reductions when they exist (e.g., [20, 44, 45, 14, 16] ). Also, results in the black-box separation framework of [21, 47] have immediate consequences for computational complexity theory. Indeed, as mentioned above, separations in this framework can be interpreted as new worlds in Impagliazzo's universe [19] .
Frontier analysis is implicit in previous works on proving impossibility or lower bounds for protocols. For instance, the analysis in [9] fits our notion of what frontier analysis is. The analysis of protocols in [8, 5, 33] also have some elements of a frontier analysis, but of a rudimentary form which was sufficient for analysis of perfect security. In [39] frontier analysis was explicitly introduced and used to prove several protocol impossibility results and characterizations. [32] also presented similar results and used somewhat similar techniques (but relied on analyzing the protocol by rounds, instead of frontiers, and incurred significant restrictions on the round complexity of the protocols for which the impossibility could be shown). We also rely on results from [38] to extend the result to general SFE functionalities as opposed to symmetric SFE functionalities.
In a concurrent work with related, but incomparable results, Haitner, Omri, and Zarosim [17, 18] show that random oracles are essentially useless in any inputless protocol. While [18] provide a general compiler to remove random oracles from inputless protocols, which has wider applications, the implications of their result for SFE are already provided by the separation in [21] (combined with a result in [26] which shows that inputless functionalities are either trivial or complete). In contrast, our result holds only for secure evaluation of deterministic functions with polynomial sized domains, but yields new black-box separations between oneway functions and SFE functionalities.
TECHNICAL OVERVIEW
We rely on a careful combination of the techniques in the black-box separation literature (in particular [21, 4, 10] ) and new frontier analysis techniques. In this section, we briefly explain the overall approach and point out some of the highlights.
A clear starting point of our investigation is the "independence learner" of [21, 4] which shows, in a protocol between Alice and Bob involving private queries to a random oracle, how to make several (but polynomially many) additional queries to the random oracle and make Alice's and Bob's views (conditioned on their inputs) independent of each other. However, from this independence property it is not immediate to conclude that random oracles are useless in SFE protocols. One conjecture (which we are not able to prove) would be that the effect of the random oracle can be "securely simulated" in the plain model, and then any protocol in the random oracle model can be compiled into a plain-model protocol that is as secure as the original one. This would avoid the need to rely on combinatorial characterizations of SFE functionalities, and indeed show that random oracles are useless for virtually any protocol (up to small, but non-negligible errors inherent in the independence learner). However, in this work we do not obtain such a compiler. In particular, we do not rule out the possibility that in fact random oracles could have unsimulatable effects, and may aid in secure computation of randomized functionalities, or functionalities with super-polynomial input domains.
This leads us to the techniques used in showing that a symmetric SFE functionality f is semi-honest securely realizable if and only if it is decomposable. The strongest version of this result was proven using frontier analysis in [39] . However, as we shall see, we need a significantly more sophisticated argument here.
Frontier Analysis Meets Random Oracles
First we describe why naïve attempts at generalizing the argument used to characterize functions with SFE protocols in the plain model [39] fail in the random oracle setting.
The plain model result crucially relies on the following "locality" property. When Alice sends the next message in a plain model protocol, she can reveal (i.e., add to the transcript) new information only about her own input but not about Bob's inputs. So, during the execution of the protocol, Alice and Bob would alternately reveal information about their inputs x and y respectively. We define two frontiers:
FX , where (significant, additional) information about x is first revealed, and FY where (significant, additional) information about y is first revealed in the transcript.
By the locality property, the frontiers FX and FY are disjoint: at nodes in FX Alice has just sent out a message, and at nodes in FY Bob has just sent out a message. Firstly, for the sake of correctness, information about x and y need to be revealed by the end of the protocol, and hence, FX and FY are almost "full" frontiers (i.e., there is only a small probability that an execution finishes without passing through both frontiers). 7 To draw a contradiction we rely on the property that, for an undecomposable function 8 it will be insecure for either party to reveal information about their input first. In terms of the frontiers, this says that it will be insecure if, a (significantly probable) portion of FX appears above FY , or if a (significantly probable) portion of FY appears above FX . Combined with the fact that both frontiers are almost full, this rules out secure protocols for undecomposable functions.
Handling the Random Oracle. In the presence of a random oracle, we lose the locality property (that Alice's message is independent of Bob's input, conditioned on the transcript). It becomes possible that a correlation is established between Alice's and Bob's views via the common random oracle, even conditioned on the transcript. Indeed, given a random oracle, a secure protocol for even OT is possible unless the curious parties query the oracle on points other than what is prescribed by the protocol. Hence, to be meaningful in the presence of an oracle, we must define the information revealed by a transcript as what a curious eavesdropper making additional (polynomially bounded) queries to the oracle, can learn. This is where the independence learner "Eve" of [21, 4] is relevant.
Intuitively, Eve attempts to learn as much as possible (staying within a budget of polynomially many oracle queries), by making all "important" queries to the oracle after each message in the protocol. By including the information obtained by Eve into the transcript itself, we can ensure that the frontiers do correspond to points where certain information is revealed, conditioned on the information obtained by Eve. Being a semi-honest setting, it is not relevant when these queries are performed; but for our frontier analysis, it will be important to consider the curious eavesdropper as running concurrently with the protocol, querying the oracle as many times as it wants, after each message in the protocol.
Main Challenge. Once the transcript is augmented with Eve's view, one could hope that the previous analysis from [39] can be applied. Indeed, in this augmented protocol, the locality property is restored. However, now we have introduced new messages in the transcript (namely Eve's interaction with the random oracle), and these messages could 7 As we shall see, for undecomposable functions, this must hold even if there are inputs for one party (say Bob) for which the function becomes constant. That is, FY needs to be crossed even for executions in which Bob's input is a value y for which the function f (·, y) is constant. This is because, by undecomposability, for certain values of Alice's input x, and another input y ′ for Bob, f (x, y) = f (x, y ′ ) where f (·, y ′ ) is not constant, and then by security, the execution with input (x, y) has to be close to the execution with input (x, y ′ ). In the latter, information about y needs to be revealed. 8 Strictly speaking, this is true only for functions which are undecomposable at the "top-most" level. In our proof, it suffices to consider such functions. be correlated with both Alice's and Bob's inputs! This is the core issue that we need to tackle.
Our Solution. Now we give an intuitive (but imprecise) description of our proof. As above, we shall define the frontiers FX and FY where information about x and (respectively) about y is first revealed in the (augmented) transcript. Now, information about x or y could be revealed when Alice sends out a message, Bob sends out a message, or Eve obtains its answers from the oracle. We will be able to rule out information about x being revealed by a message from Bob, or information about y being revealed by a message from Alice (see "Locality Guarantee" in Section 2.2), but this leaves open the possibility that the oracle's response to a query by Eve reveals information about x and y simultaneously. In other words, while we can still rule out the possibility that FX occurs strictly above FY with significant probability and vice versa, we are left with the possibility that they can almost always coincide.
To address this, we pursue the following intuition: suppose it turns out that in an execution of the protocol, augmented with Eve's queries, the first time significant information about x is revealed is simultaneously (and hence, possibly, safely) with information about y; thus, for instance, if f (x0,ŷ0) = f (x1,ŷ0), but f (x0,ŷ1) = f (x1,ŷ1), then the distinction between x =x0 and x =x1 could be revealed in this execution only when Bob's input isŷ1 and not when his input isŷ0. Nevertheless, by using our strategy, Bob can learn this distinction even if his input isŷ0. This rules out the possibility that the frontiers FX and FY can coincide with significant probability.
VA,x(w) VE(w) Figure 1 : Simulating the oracle answers when mentally switching inputs.
We sketch the idea behind the curious-Bob strategy. Suppose an execution of the augmented protocol reaches a point w where Bob wants to mentally switch his input from his actual inputŷ0 to a distinguishing inputŷ1. Let Alice, Bob and Eve have views VA,x(w), V B,ŷ 0 (w) and VE(w). Bob can sample for himself a view V B,ŷ 1 (w) conditioned on his input beingŷ1, consistent with VE(w). To simulate the next step (prior to the next message from Alice) in the execution with the new view, Bob needs to simulate the random oracle correctly. However, the actual random oracle he has access to is conditioned on the view V B,ŷ 0 (w), and it will be pointless to use this oracle with the freshly sampled view V B,ŷ 1 (w). Instead, Bob will simulate a random oracle as shown in Figure 1 . The ovals represent the sets of queries in the views VA,x(w), VE(w), V B,ŷ 0 (w) and V B,ŷ 1 (w). Queries already answered in VE(w) (blue) or in the hypothetical Bob view V B,ŷ 1 (w) (orange) are answered according to these views. Answers to the remaining queries in V B,ŷ 0 (w) (green), are freshly sampled. All other queries are answered using the actual random oracle. Note that the queries in the orange and green regions are not answered according to the actual random oracle. Conditioned on none of those queries being present in Alice's view (which we refer to as a "safety" condition, below), the simulation with the switched input is perfect, and then, based on the outcome of this simulation (a single step in the execution) Bob can distinguish between x0 andx1. To complete the above argument, we show that at the points at which Bob carries out this simulation, the safety condition does indeed hold with high probability (see "Safety Guarantee" from Eve, in Section 2.2).
Technical Issues. Formalizing the above intuitive description presents several challenges. Recall that above we argued in terms of "the probability of reaching (a segment of) a frontier". One important issue is that this probability depends on the inputs. Whether these probabilities are similar or different for different inputs depends on whether the inputs have already been distinguished or not-that is, which frontiers occur above this frontier. Note that we use properties of the distribution over frontiers to reason about the ordering of the frontiers. But these distributions themselves depend on the ordering of the frontiers! Nevertheless, by employing appropriately defined frontiers we manage to implement the above outline while avoiding circularities.
Using the Independence Learner
As mentioned above, a crucial tool for analyzing protocols using a random oracle is to show that by making polynomially many queries to the oracle, an eavesdropper Eve can get sufficient information conditioned on which, Alice and Bob's views in the protocol are almost always close to being independent (up to an inverse polynomially small error). This is a delicate argument implicitly proved in [4] building on ideas from [21] , and was first explicitly described in [10] .
In our proof outlined above, we need to adapt this Eve and the guarantees provided by it.
Adapting the Independence Learner. A subtle issue to address when adapting the Eve strategy of [4] is that, in our case, Alice and Bob receive arbitrary inputs which Eve does not see. In particular, Alice and Bob could receive correlated inputs, and we cannot claim that their views, conditioned on Eve's view, are (almost always, close to being) independent. However, we can create an Eve which is oblivious to the actual inputs, but for every input pair (x, y) of inputs, when the protocol is executed with these inputs, Alice's and Bob's views conditioned on Eve's view are (almost always, close to being) independent. For this, we take Eve to be as defined in [4] , but applied to an inputless protocol obtained by invoking the original protocols with independent, random inputs (x, y). Note that initially, from the point of view of this Eve, the actual inputs would have significant probability to be the randomly chosen inputs (since the inputs come from a polynomially large domain). In analyzing this Eve, we rely on an argument that with significant probability, at any round of the protocol, this Eve will continue to consider the actual input to be a likely input (refer to the full version [36] for a formal statement).
In our analysis sketched above, there are two guarantees from this Eve that we rely on:
Locality Guarantee: Alice's Message Independent of Bob's Input. Firstly, recall that the purpose of introducing Eve's view into the transcript was to restore the "locality property" -i.e., Alice's messages, conditioned on Eve's view, are independent of Bob's view. More precisely, for our setting with inputs, the guarantee from our Eve is that, at a point where Alice is about to send a message, if two inputs of Bob, y and y ′ are both somewhat likely, then Alice's message is almost independent of which of these two inputs Bob has. Note that we need this to hold (and this holds) only at points where both of Bob's inputs y and y ′ are somewhat likely. (In using this claim, the points considered will be above the frontier FY where all inputs for Bob are indeed significantly probable.)
Safety Guarantee: Collisions of Private Queries Unlikely. As mentioned in the outline above, the second place where we rely on Eve's properties is in arguing the "safety" of the curious Bob strategy: i.e., when curious Bob samples a view for himself after Alice sends a message, it is unlikely that there will be an oracle query that is not present in Eve's view, but exists both in Alice's actual view and in either Bob's actual view or the freshly sampled view. (Note that we need the safety condition to occur only when the "fake" input y ′ used for the sampled view is somewhat likely. Again, the claim will be applied to points above the frontier FY , and indeed all inputs are somewhat likely there.) We remark that, just for the actual views, similar statements were already explicitly proven in [21, 4] , bounding the probability of an "intersection query" (query present in Alice's and Bob's views) that is not present in Eve's view. The additional twist in our case is that rather than Bob's actual view alone, we need to consider the view sampled for a "fake" input as well; further, Bob's views we consider are not at the point Eve finishes a round of oracle queries, but after he receives a subsequent message from Alice (before he makes his own oracle queries). Nevertheless, a careful analysis shows that our Eve does give this stronger guarantee (refer to the full version [36] for details).
PRELIMINARIES
Here we summarize some of the basic terminology; we refer the interested readers to the full version of the paper [36] for details.
2-Party Functions.
A (deterministic) 2-party function f : X × Y → ZA × ZB maps a pairs of inputs (x, y) (associated with Alice and Bob respectively) to a pair of outputs (a, b) (for the two parties, respectively). For most part in our proofs, we shall be dealing with symmetric 2-party functions which produce two identical outputs (or equivalently, a single output given to both parties).
For symmetric functions, an Alice-cut is a partition (X,X) of the input space X such that for any x ∈ X,x ∈X and y ∈ Y f (x, y) = f (x, y). The functions associated with an Alice-cut (X,X) are the two restrictions of f , restricted to domain X × Y and to domainX × Y. A Bob-cut and functions associated with it are defined similarly. Now, we define decomposable functions f in the following recursive manner [33, 5] :
• A constant function is decomposable.
• If f has an Alice-cut or a Bob-cut and the two functions associated with that cut are both decomposable then f is decomposable.
A function is undecomposable if it is not decomposable. Moreover, it is said to be undecomposable at the top-most level, if f : X ×Y → Z does not have an Alice-cut or Bob-cut (refer to the full version of the paper [36] for some examples).
Secure Function Evaluation and Security Definitions.
We use standard definitions of Secure Function Evaluation (SFE) and simulation based security definitions for semihonest, standalone and UC security. More detailed definitions can be found in the full version of the paper [36] .
Random Oracles. Given a security parameter κ, a random oracle O randomly maps κ-bit strings to κ-bit strings. Security requirements for a protocol are over the random choice of this oracle. The parties do not learn the value of O(x) until they query the oracle on x. In a protocol, each party can query the random oracle privately; but the oracle is common, in that if the parties query it at at the same input, they receive the same output.
Frontiers. Consider a (possibly infinite) sequence of correlated random variables (m1, m2, . . . ). We consider a natural representation of such a sequence as a rooted tree, with each level corresponding to a random variable mi and each node v at depth t in the tree is uniquely identified with an assignment of values (m1, . . . , mt) to (m1, . . . , mt), such that (m1, . . . , mt−1) is equal to the values identified with its parent node. Then we can identify the sequence of values of these random variables with a unique path in this tree, starting at the root.
We can identify a set of nodes S in this tree with the event that the path corresponding to the values taken by the random variables intersects S. A frontier on this tree corresponds to a set F of nodes which is "prefix-free" (i.e., no two nodes in F are on the same path starting at the root). We often define a frontier using a predicate, as the set of nodes which satisfy the predicate but do not have an ancestor which satisfies the predicate (i.e., the predicate is satisfied for the "first time"). Note that the frontier event is deterministic given a node in the tree (though the event could be in terms of the probability of other events at that node).
The tree naturally defines an "ancestor" partial order of the nodes in the tree: we say u v if u occurs somewhere on the path from the root of the tree to v (u could be identical to v). If u v, but u = v, then we write u ≺ v.
Invariably, we consider this tree only with sequence of random variables corresponding to the messages exchanged in a protocol (but possibly augmented by additional messages added for analysis). Though not necessary, it will be convenient to consider the underlying process as consisting of picking a uniformly random input and then executing the protocol. However, clearly, the tree and frontiers can be used to represent any sequence of random variables.
Transcript Tree
Augmented Protocol Execution. We shall consider twoparty protocols Π where Alice and Bob interact to evaluate a (symmetric) function f : X × Y → Z on their respective local inputs x ∈ X and y ∈ Y. We shall assume that |X | and |Y| are both polynomial in the security parameter. Alice and Bob have access to a random oracle O. We "augment" the protocol Π with a "public query strategy" Eve, which can see the publicly generated transcript and can also query the random oracle. For simplicity, we consider Eve to be deterministic (as will be the case in our instantiation of Eve). We shall instantiate Eve as described in the full version of this paper [36] (applied to an input less protocol obtained by using uniformly randomly chosen inputs for Π).
When Alice is supposed to generate the next message, she queries the random oracle at some points. Based on her local view, she then generates the next message of the protocol using her next message generation algorithm. Similarly, Bob also generates the next message of the protocol during his turns. Eve, on the other hand, simply performs several queries to the random oracle and announces all her queries and their corresponding answers at the end of her turn. For concreteness we shall assume that the protocol starts with Alice sending a message. Alice and Bob take turns alternately, with Eve getting a turn after every Alice or Bob message (i.e., the messages will be sent by Alice, Eve, Bob, Eve, . . . ).
We shall refer to this protocol as the "augmented protocol" (Π, Eve). The total number of Alice and Bob messages is N . A round in this augmented protocol corresponds to a party sending a message followed by Eve adding a list of queryanswer pairs.
Augmented Transcript Tree T + . Our analysis considers the transcript tree T + of an execution of Π augmented with a public query strategy Eve. The T + associated with an augmented protocol (Π, Eve), is the tree as defined in Section 3 with the sequence of random variables (m1, m2, . . . ) being the messages added to the transcript of the augmented protocol by Alice, Eve and Bob during an execution. In other words, the nodes in the transcript tree are all the possible partial transcripts in the augmented protocol execution, with a directed edge from a node u to a node v, if the partial transcript associated with v is obtained by adding exactly one message (from Alice, Bob or Eve) to the partial transcript of u.
For convenience we add an initial "dummy" round, in which Alice sends a fixed message followed by Bob sending a fixed message. These correspond to two dummy nodes at the root of T + . We shall denote by Anodes and Bnodes the sets of Alice and Bob nodes, and by Achildren and Bchildren the sets of (Eve) nodes that are children of, respectively, Alice nodes and Bob nodes. The tree T + naturally defines an "ancestor" partial order of the nodes in the tree: we say u v if u occurs somewhere on the path from the root of the tree to v (u could be identical to v). If u v, but u = v, then we write u ≺ v. We define ancstrs(v) = {w|w v}.
Parent of u (represented by parent(u)) is defined as w such that w ≺ u and ∀v, v ≺ u ⇒ v w. A partial transcript u is said to intersect v if v u. We emphasize that although a round in the augmented protocol comprises of a party sending a message and Eve adding oracle queries-answer pairs to the transcript, we represent them separately in the tree, i.e., in a root to leaf path in T + has Alice and Bob nodes followed by Eve nodes (except the two initial dummy nodes).
For any partial transcript w, we define the views of Alice, Bob and Eve consistent with the partial transcript w. The Eve view consistent with w is represented by VE(w). When considering distribution of Alice/Bob views consistent with a partial transcript, probability is over the choice of random tapes for Alice and Bob and the random oracle. We emphasize that the local views of parties contain only those query-answer pairs which were generated during next message generation of messages already present in w. So, if Alice sends the next message in a round and the resulting transcript was w, then Bob's views consistent with w will contain only query-answer pairs which were generated in previous rounds. Bob's view gets updated with new query-answer pairs when he sends the next message in the protocol.
Strictly Above a Set: u ≺ F and F1 ≺ F2. We shall abuse the ≺ notation slightly, and use it in the following senses too: if u is a node and F is a set of nodes, we write u ≺ F (read as u is strictly above F ) if u can be reached from the root without passing through any node in F (i.e., there is no v ∈ F such that v u); note that for u to be strictly above F , it is not necessary to have any v ∈ F such that u ≺ v. For two sets of nodes F1, F2, we define the event F1 ≺ F2 to occur if the transcript path of an execution passes through a node v ∈ F1 strictly before passing through any node in F2 (it may or may not pass through a node in F2 afterwards).
PROOF OUTLINE
In this section we start presenting our formal proofs, including the definitions of the main frontiers used. The complete proof appears in the full version of the paper [36] .
First we prove that there is no semi-honest secure protocol for a 2-party symmetric function f that is undecomposable at the top-most level, which forms the bulk of our proof. Then we extend this result to more general functions to complete the proof of Theorem 1.1. Finally, this impossibility result against semi-honest secure adversaries can be extended to malicious adversaries in the Fcom-hybrid, to prove Theorem 1.2. In the rest of this section, we restrict ourselves to the proof for symmetric function that are undecomposable at the top-most level.
Frontiers
Recall that the main bottleneck of our proof is that curious eavesdropper's queries could simultaneously reveal information about both Alice and Bob's private inputs. We shall carefully deal with this issue by defining suitable frontiers, F θ X and F θ Y . F θ X is defined as the the following set: 9
{v : v is the first node on the path from root to v s.t.
Intuitively, F θ X is the first place where, for some input y of Bob, a significant distinction is made between some two inputs of Alice, x and x ′ . We require this distinction to be in terms of information revealed in a single message in the augmented protocol (hence the conditioning on parent(v)). We also count this distinction as valid only if it occurs for an input of Bob that is somewhat likely (assuming a uniform prior over Bob's inputs). 10 Similarly, we define F θ Y . Before proceeding further, it is useful to recall how the frontier analysis proceeds in [39] for proving the same result in the plain model setting (without random oracles). The frontiers there are (something similar to) F 0 X and F 0 Y defined above. Firstly, from the correctness of the protocol, both these frontiers are almost full, i.e., nearly all transcripts (except with probability 1 /poly(κ)) intersect both F 0 X and F 0 Y . Further, in the plain model setting, F 0 X has only Bob nodes (where Alice has just sent out a message) and similarly, F 0 Y has only Alice nodes; so the two frontiers do not intersect. Since both the frontiers are almost full and do not intersect, at least one of them should occur above the other with at least about 1 2 probability (when a transcript is randomly generated by an honest execution). But if F 0 X occurs above (i.e., before) F 0 Y with significant probability, then a semihonest Bob would learn significant amount of information about Alice's input, irrespective of his own input, thereby breaking the security of the protocol. On the other hand, if F 0 Y occurs above F 0 X with significant probability, then a semi-honest Alice would break the security of the protocol. Thus, in either case the protocol is not secure.
In our case, similar to above, again we have that F θ X and F θ Y are almost full frontiers (when θ is small enough). But in trying to follow the above plan, the main bottleneck for us is that it is no more true that the two frontiers cannot intersect: indeed, on nodes where Eve has just added its message to the transcript, information about both Alice's and Bob's private inputs could be simultaneously revealed, and the two frontiers could coincide. The key element in the proof is to show that an honest-but-curious Bob could render the protocol insecure if nodes in F θ X occurs at or above F θ Y with significant probability (and symmetrically for Alice)as opposed to giving an attack by Bob that works only when the nodes in F θ X occur strictly above F θ Y . Formally, we define the frontierF
Then, our goal is to show that ifFX (resp.FY , defined symmetrically) has a significant probability, then an honestbut-curious Bob (resp. Alice) can violate the security of the protocol.
Steps of the Proof
Below, we present the proof ideas in a top down fashion, starting with the final contradiction. We provide an intuitive summary of each step.
Assuming that there is a secure protocol for an undecomposable 2-party function f , we derive a contradiction. This contradiction follows from the following (informally stated) claims below.
1. Frontiers are full. The frontiers F θ X and F θ Y are both almost always encountered by an honest protocol execution. This claim leverages the correctness of the protocol as well as the fact that the function f is not constant (i.e., each parties reveals information about their private input to the other.
2. Frontier Ordering.FX andFY have low probability (i.e., , nodes in F θ X are unlikely to occur on or above F θ Y , and vice versa). This claim leverages that the function f is undecomposable at the top-most level, i.e., no party can reveal information about its private input before the other party.
The proof of the first claim above relies on the correctness of the protocol. The proof of the second claim, which relies on the security of the protocol, is more involved, and is broken up into parts, as described next. Note that to prove this claim, it suffices to bound the probability ofFX ; the claim forFY is symmetric.
Proving the Frontier Ordering. It turns out that instead ofFX , it is easier to work with FX, which consists of nodes u ∈ F θ X such that u is on or above F 0 Y (rather than on or above F θ Y ). The proof relies on the following claims:
This follows from the claim that the frontier F θ Y is full, except that θ = 0 in this case.
Probability of encountering
3. Probability of encountering FX is small.
Of these, the last claim has an involved proof. It comprises of the following steps:
1. Part 1: Identifying a Minor. First, we show that there are two inputs each, {x0,x1} for Alice and {ŷ0,ŷ1} for Bob (i.e., , a 2 × 2 minor in the function) that we can focus on, to show that the protocol cannot be secure if FX has significant probability. We identify a segment FX ⊆ FX with a significant fraction of the probability mass on FX , which we then bound in the next two steps. This region FX is further partitioned into two parts: SX and RX based on whether the partial transcript is just after Alice has spoken or not. The final two steps of the proof deal with these two regions separately.
Part 2:
Bounding the probability of SX . This part is similar to the proof for the problem in the case of plain model protocols. It uses the Locality Property of the augmented protocol. Recall that SX is just after Alice has sent a message so any information revealed by Alice about her input is independent of the private input of Bob. Then, at any node in SX (where information about Alice input is divulged), Bob can break the security of the protocol.
Part 3:
Bounding the probability of RX . This is the most technical part of our proof. It essentially shows that even if the information about Alice input is revealed during Eve queries, Bob can violate the semihonest security of the protocol by being curious. The strategy of Bob as introduced in Figure 1 is used.
Eavesdropper Strategy and Properties. We use the curious eavesdropper developed for input-less protocol by [4, 10] to ensure the Locality and Safety guarantees for protocols where parties also have private inputs.
• Independence Learner. We start from the Eve algorithm presented in [4, 10] for input-less protocols. This eavesdropper gathers enough information from the random oracle, so that conditioned on its view, Alice's and Bob's views are independent of each other (conditioned on the public transcript generated).
• Locality Property. Based on the input-less Eve presented above, we construct an Eve strategy where parties have private inputs. Intuitively, it assumes that parties sample their inputs uniformly at random and runs the "input-less Eve" in this hypothetical setting. This lemma can be strengthened to assert that when a party speaks, she can only divulge information about her own private inputs (conditioned on our eavesdropper's view).
• Safety Property. The previous result can be further strengthened to show that intersection queries of Bob's actual and hypothetical views with Alice queries are contained in our Eve's query list. This result is also proven based on the eavesdropper properties of the "input-less Eve."
CONCLUSION & OPEN PROBLEMS
We have shown a black-box separation between one-way functions and semi-honest SFE protocols for 2-party secure function evaluation for any finite deterministic function which does not already have a semi-honest SFE protocol in the plain model. Intuitively, this provides strong evidence that there could be numerous, if not infinitely many, natural, distinct "worlds" (a la Impagliazzo's Worlds) between Minicrypt and Cryptomania: the Many Worlds Conjecture (MWC, see Section 1).
We leave proving the MWC as the main open problem from this work. In particular, we have only established that the world with (semi-honest) SFE for various functions is "strictly stronger" than minicrypt, but not that it is "strictly weaker" than cryptomania (where oblivious transfer protocols exist). The first step in proving the MWC would be to show that there exist functions which yield worlds strictly intermediate to minicrypt and cryptomania.
Another open problem is to extend our current result to a larger class of functions. Our result relies on the combinatorial properties of undecomposable functions. In particular, we do not "compile out" the random oracle -i.e., we do not give a strategy to transform any protocol in the random oracle model to one in the plain model that is as secure as the original one. This leaves open the possibility that for certain classes of 2-party computation problems, like randomized functions (for which the characterization of non-triviality in terms of undecomposability is not applicable), the random oracle model could enable secure computation. We ask if random oracles can indeed be compiled out from all 2-party secure computation protocols.
